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Abstract: We study the individual compliance behavior of polluting firms in an 
experimental setting under two different penalty functions (a linear and a strictly 
convex) and two different regulatory instruments (emission standards and tradable 
pollution permits). We find that a convex penalty, as compared to a linear penalty, 
increases the market price of pollution permits and the violation rate of firms. The effect 
of the structure of the fine on the price of permits operates through an increase in the 
ask-prices of sellers, not on the bids by suppliers. With convex penalties, sellers are not 
willing to sell a permit at a price as low as with linear penalties. We do not observe an 
effect of convex penalties on the compliance status of firms with emission standards. 
These results call for attention on the possible effect that the type of penalties may have 
on the cost-effectiveness of pollution control programs based on tradable pollution 
permits. 
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1 Introduction 
Monetary fines in environmental policy commonly have two components: a financial 
(or economic) benefit component and a gravity (or deterrent) component. (See, for 
example, the “Guidance for Enforcement and Sanctions” of the U.K. Environment 
Agency (2015) and the “Policy on Civil Penalties: EPA General Enforcement Policy”, 
U.S.E.P.A. (1984)). The goal of the economic benefit component of a fine is to remove 
the economic benefit of noncompliance. The goal of the gravity component is to deter 
future violations. It is an additional amount “to ensure that the violator is worse off than 
if it had obeyed the law. This additional amount should reflect the seriousness of the 
violation.” (U.S.E.P.A. 1984, p. 3). The seriousness of the violation depends, in part, on 
the actual or possible harm. The assessment of this harm should take into consideration 
the amount of pollution. (U.S.E.P.A. 1984). Whether the fine should be linear or convex 
(progressive) in the level of the violation, is something that these official sanction 
guidance documents leave for the discretion of the enforcer. 
The issue of whether to use a penalty that is linear or convex in the level of violation 
is not addressed also in the seminal works of the economic literature of enforcing 
environmental regulation (Harford (1978 and 1987), Viscusi and Zeckhauser (1979), 
Harrington (1988), Malik (1990 and 1992), and Stranlund and Dhanda (1999)).2 The 
reason may be that, according to seminal work by Becker (1968), the structure of the 
penalty function is irrelevant to the compliance decision. What matters is that the 
expected marginal fine for the “first unit” of violation is higher than the marginal 
                                                 
2 Although some authors have considered the case of decreasing marginal penalties (Keeler (1991), for 
example), we do not deal with decreasing marginal penalties in this work.  
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benefit. The objective of this work is to test this irrelevance. To perform these tests, we 
compare the predicted versus the actual individual and aggregate level of violations 
using laboratory experiments with undergrad students. In the experiments the 
enforcement level is “just enough” to induce an expected–profit maximizer to comply 
with the norm. The norm takes the form of an emission standard in a set of experiments 
and a market for emission permits in another set.  
An important policy implication arise from testing whether firms respond differently 
to linear versus convex penalties, when both induce the same level of emissions. As 
showed by Stranlund (2007) for the case of tradable permits and Arguedas (2008) for 
the case of pollution standards, minimizing the expected social costs of reaching an 
emissions target requires full compliance with a linear penalty. However, if the firms 
react differently to a linear penalty than to a convex penalty, the relative cost-
effectiveness of linear versus convex penalties may need a revaluation. In other words, 
because the type of the penalty determines the overall expected cost of the pollution 
control program, testing the response of firms to different penalties may give regulators 
information on the expected cost of the program, which could differ from the theoretical 
expected costs if firms react differently to linear versus convex penalty. 
To our knowledge, the only work that tests the effect of penalties on the 
compliance levels of firms in an experimental setting is Restiani and Betz (2010).3 They 
test three types of penalties in a market for pollution permits: a fixed rate (constant 
                                                 
3 Anderson et al. (2017) studied the deterrence effect of different penalty structures for repeat offenders. 
In this framework, penalties are increasing, decreasing or constant in the number of previous discovered 
offenses, and the nature of the model is dynamic. In our case, penalties are decreasing, increasing or 
constant in the level of the violation and the nature of the model and the decision is static.  
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marginal penalty), a make-good provision system (offset penalty) and a mixed penalty 
that combines both. They conclude that different penalty designs do not translate into 
different permit prices and that the compliance rate is higher for the fixed rate penalty, 
despite theory predicts no difference. Nevertheless, their design includes perfect 
monitoring; i.e. the regulator can observe the firms’ emissions at every moment. In 
contrast, we analyze the impact of different penalty structures under imperfect 
monitoring; i.e. the regulator audits the firms’ emissions with a certain probability. This 
is an important actual element of any environmental policy. 
We organize the paper as follows. In section 2, we present the main hypotheses 
we want to evaluate and the theory behind them. Section 3 contains a description of the 
experimental design. Section 4 describes the experimental procedures. Section 5 
presents the results. Finally, in Section 6, we put forward a discussion and concluding 
remarks from our work. 
2 Compliance Behavior and Hypotheses 
Assume a polluting firm operating under either an emissions standard or a 
competitive transferable permits system, along with a fixed number of other 
heterogeneous firms. The firm’s abatement cost function is c(q), which is strictly 
decreasing and convex in the firm’s emissions q [c(q) < 0 and c(q) > 0].4 In line with 
the vast majority of theoretical work in this area, we assume that firm’s objective is to 
maximize expected profits.  
                                                 
4 The abatement cost function is defined as 𝑐(𝑞) = 𝑏(𝑞𝑢) − 𝑏(𝑞), where 𝑏(. ) is the profit 
function, 𝑏′(𝑞) > 0, 𝑏′′(𝑞) < 0 and 𝑞𝑢 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑏(𝑞). Under the previous assumptions, 𝑞𝑢 > 𝑞.  
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The environmental policy target is a fixed aggregate level of emissions 𝑄. The 
regulator audits polluting firms with a random exogenous probability 𝜋. An audit 
provides the regulator perfect information about firms’ compliance status. A firm is in 
violation (v) when its units of emissions exceed its permit holdings or its emission 
standard (more on this below). If the firm is audited and found in violation, a penalty 
f(v) is imposed.  
2.1 Transferable Emission Permits System 
Under a system of transferable emissions permits, a total of L = 𝑄 licenses are 
issued by the regulator, each of which confers the legal right to release one unit of 
emissions to the possessor. Under the assumption of perfect competition, the market for 
permits generates a unique equilibrium price p of licenses. Let l0 be the initial allocation 
of licenses to the firm and let l be the number of licenses that the firm holds after trade. 
When a firm is non-compliant, its emissions exceed the number of licenses it holds and 
the level of its violation is 𝑣 = 𝑞 − 𝑙 >  0 for 𝑞 > 𝑙, 0 otherwise. 
A firm chooses its emissions and permits to minimize expected costs. These are 
comprised of abatement costs, expenditures from buying permits minus earnings from 
selling permits and the expected penalty. If the firm’s choice of emissions q equals its 
demand of permits l(p), the firm is in compliance. We know that in this system a risk-
neutral firm is compliant if and only if – 𝑐′(𝑙) ≤  𝑓′(0) = 𝜋𝜑  (see for example, Malik 
(1990) or Stranlund and Dhanda (1999)). Stranlund (2008) shows that this condition is 
also necessary and sufficient to induce compliance in the case of risk-averse managers. 
We also know from the literature that the optimal choice of emissions implies – 𝑐′(𝑞) =
𝑝, which implicitly defines q(p). If the number of firms that participate in the market is 
n, the equilibrium price of permits with perfect-compliance ( )Lp  is implicitly defined 
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by the perfect – compliance equilibrium condition for the market for pollution permits, 
∑ 𝑙𝑖(𝑝) = 𝐿 = 𝑄 =  ∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1 . Hence, under a transferable emissions permit system, 
perfect compliance requires 𝑝(𝐿) ≤ 𝜋𝜑. If this condition is not met, the firm chooses to 
demand a number of permits equal to 𝑙(𝑝, , 𝜑, 𝛾 )  <  𝑞(𝑝). This number of permits 
𝑙(𝑝, , 𝜑, 𝛾) is the solution to 𝑝 =  𝜋[𝜑 +  𝛾(𝑞(𝑝) –  𝑙)]. The permit market equilibrium 
condition when violations occurs is ∑ 𝑙𝑖(𝑝, 𝜋, 𝜑, 𝛾) = 𝐿 < 𝑄
𝑛
𝑖=1 , which implicitly 
defines the non-compliance equilibrium permit price as a function of the total number of 
licenses and enforcement parameters; that is, 𝑝𝑛𝑐(𝐿, 𝝅, 𝜑, 𝛾), where 𝝅 is a vector of 
monitoring probabilities on regulated firms. 
2.2 Emissions Standards 
We consider now the case in which each firm i faces an emissions standard 𝑠𝑖. 
This is a maximum allowable (legal) level of emissions for each firm. Emissions 
standards for all firms satisfy ∑ 𝑠𝑖 =
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑄. Under an emissions standard, a firm chooses 
the level of emissions to minimize its total expected compliance costs, which consist of 
its abatement costs plus the expected penalty. As it is known, a risk-neutral firm will be 
compliant (𝑞 =  𝑠) if and only if – 𝑐′(𝑠) ≤  𝑓′(0) = 𝜋𝜑 (Heyes 2000; Malik 1992; 
Harford 1978). This condition is also necessary and sufficient to induce compliance in 
the case of risk-averse managers.5 If – 𝑐′(𝑠) > 𝜋𝜑, the firm is going to choose a level of 
emissions 𝑞(𝑠, , 𝜑, 𝛾) > 𝑠, where 𝑞(𝑠, , 𝜑, 𝛾) is the solution to  – 𝑐 (𝑞) = 𝜋[𝜑 +
𝛾(𝑞 –  𝑠)]. 
                                                 
5 The derivation of this result is available upon request. 
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2.3 Hypotheses 
We are now ready to present the main hypotheses that we evaluate with our laboratory 
experiments. 
Hypothesis 1: In a system of transferable emission permits where the expected 
marginal penalty is just enough to induce compliance by expected profit maximizers 
firms, the level of individual and aggregate violations is independent of the penalty 
structure. 
 
As previously discussed, under a system of transferable emission permits, a firm 
complies if and only if−𝑐′(𝑞 = 𝑙) = 𝑝(𝐿) < 𝜋𝑓′(0) = 𝜋𝜑. Assume 𝜋𝜑 =  𝑝(𝐿) + 𝜀, 
where 𝜀 > 0 is an arbitrarily small amount. Because this condition can be obtained with 
a convex penalty function 𝑓(𝑣) = 𝜑 × 𝑣 +  𝛾/2 × 𝑣2 (with φ > 0 and 𝛾 ≥  0), or a 
linear penalty function 𝑓(𝑣) = 𝜑 × 𝑣, we should expect no differences in violations 
between both schemes.  
 
Hypothesis 2: In a system of emissions standards where the expected marginal penalty 
is just enough to induce compliance by expected profit maximizers firms, the level of 
violations is independent of the penalty structure. 
 
The reasoning for the case of emission standards is the same as for the case of 
tradable permits, except that in the case of emissions standards the compliance 
condition is firm specific. More specifically, the enforcement level must be such that 
 𝜋𝑖𝜑 =  −𝑐𝑖
′(𝑠𝑖) + 𝜀 for all 𝑖. 
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3 Experimental Design 
We framed the experiments as a neutral production decision of an unspecified 
fictitious good q, from which the subjects obtained benefits. Every subject had a 
production capacity of 10 units (whole numbers), but the benefits of production differed 
between subjects, giving place to four types of subjects: two with “high” marginal 
benefits and two with “low” marginal benefits. These schedules of marginal benefits, 
taken from Cason and Gangadharan (2006), were the same through all the experiments 
and we assigned them randomly across subjects.6 
3.1 Tradable permits 
In the permits experiments, subjects had to decide how much to produce of the 
fictitious good but they had to possess one permit in order to be legally able to produce 
each unit of the good. Each subject received an initial number of permits without cost at 
the beginning of the experiments. Subjects could also buy or sell permits in a permit-by-
permit double-auction market comprised by 8 subjects, 2 of each type. In these auctions 
every subject could either make a bid for a permit, submit an asking price to sell a 
permit, or accept a bid or an asking price made by another subject. Each experiment 
consisted of 10 identical rounds. At the end of each production round, the subjects were 
audited with a known homogeneous predetermined and exogenous probability π. If 
audited, the number of units produced by the subject i in that period  (𝑞𝑖) was compared 
with the number of permits possessed by the subject i at the end of the period (𝑙𝑖). If 
 𝑞𝑖 > 𝑙𝑖 , the subject was automatically fined. The subjects had the information on the 
                                                 
6 See Table A.1 in the Online Appendix, available at 
http://www2.um.edu.uy/marcaffera/investigacion/OnlineAppendix_Structure_of_penalties.pdf 
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probability of inspection that they faced and on the marginal fine for every level of 
violation in their screens at every moment before making their decisions. 
We constructed two treatments for the case of markets for permits, both of them 
designed to induce compliance (see Table 1). In Treatment M1, the total number of 
tradable permits supplied to each group of 8 subjects was 40. Four (4) permits were 
initially allocated free of charge to subjects of type 1 and 2, the prospective buyers, and 
6 permits for subjects of type 3 and 4, the prospective sellers.7 The enforcement 
parameters took the values φ = 100, γ = 66 and π =
80
133
. Treatment M2 is the same as 
Treatment M1, except for the fine schedule. More precisely, in Treatment M2  φ = 133, 
and γ = 0. The resulting perfect-compliance equilibrium price of the market in both 
cases is expected to be between 74 and 80 experimental pesos (E$). Therefore,  𝑝∗(𝐿) ≤
𝜋𝑓(1) = 80 in both treatments. Therefore, both treatments should induce the same 
perfect-compliance equilibrium price of permits and the same individual level of 
emissions.8 Hence, the expected level of aggregate emissions is also 40 units for both 
treatments.  
3.2 Standards 
Similar to the case of tradable permits, we constructed two treatments for the case 
of emission standards; labeled S1 and S2 in Table 1. In the standards experiments 
subjects faced a maximum allowable level of emissions (the standard) and had to decide 
                                                 
7 We chose this initial allocation of permits as opposed to a homogeneous allocation (5-each) as a way to 
foster the market activity. The number of expected trades consistent with this initial allocation is 5. 
8 We call “emissions” the output chosen by the subjects although, as we have already mentioned, we 
framed the experiment as a neutral production decision. 
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how much to emit. In the treatment S1, the emission standards were 7, 6, 4 and 3 for 
firms’ types 1 to 4, respectively. (These are the cost-effective levels of emissions). The 
auditing procedure was as in the case of tradable permits, with the exception that in the 
case of standards perfect-compliance requires targeting inspections according to the 
marginal abatement costs of the firms. Accordingly, the auditing probabilities were 0.6, 
0.65, 0.63 and 0.66 for types 1 to 4, respectively. Finally, violations are fined with the 
same penalty function used in M1; 𝜑 = 100 and 𝛾 = 66. This policy induces 
compliance, so the expected aggregate level of production is 40 units in a group of 8 
subjects.9 In the treatment S2, everything is equal to S1, except the structure of the 
penalty, which is that of M2; 𝜑 = 133 and 𝛾 = 0. In other words, treatment S2 induces 
perfect compliance, as S1, but with a linear penalty schedule. 
 
Table 1: Summary of Treatment design 
Policy 
Instrument 
Treatment 
Penalty  
function: 
𝝋𝒗 +
𝜸
𝟐
𝒗𝟐 𝝅 Cap  
Predicted  
Behavior 
Predicted  
Equilibrium  
price 
𝜑 𝛾 
MARKET FOR 
EMISSION 
PERMITS 
M1 100 66 
80
133
 40 
Type 1: q = l = 7, v = 0 
Type 2: q = l = 6, v = 0 
Type 3: q = l = 4, v = 0 
Type 4: q = l = 3, v = 0 
$74 - $80 
M2 133 0 
EMISSION 
STANDARDS 
S1 100 66 
Type 1: 
 0.60 
Type 2:  
0.65 
Type 3:  
0.63 
Type 4: 
 0.66 
40 
Type 1: q=s=7, v=0 
Type 2: q=s=6, v=0 
Type 3: q=s=4, v=0 
Type 4: q=s=3, v=0 
 
S2 133 0 
 
                                                 
9 The number of subjects showing up for standards experiments was not multiple of eight in five of the 
eight sessions. We allowed this to avoid disappointing subjects in a thin pool.  
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4 Experimental Procedures  
We programmed the experiments in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted 
them in a computer lab specifically designed for these experiments at the University of 
Montevideo, between December 2011 and April 2012. 
We recruited the participants from the undergrad student population of the 
University of Montevideo, the University of the Republic, the Catholic University and 
ORT University; all in the city of Montevideo, Uruguay. In a given experimental 
session, subjects played two treatments of tradable permits or two treatments of 
emission standards. Each session consisted of 20 rounds. In the first 10 rounds subjects 
participated in one treatment. In the second 10 rounds they participated in another 
treatment. In one treatment we induce perfect compliance (M1 or M2 in a permits 
session; S1 or S2 in a standards session). The results presented here are from these 
treatments. In the other treatment, the probability of being inspected was lower, 
inducing violations. The order of treatments differed between groups in a session. 
Approximately half of the people that showed up in the room for a session played the 
compliance treatment first, and the other half played the violation treatment first.  
Before the beginning of the experiments, we handed out instructions to subjects 
and we read them aloud, after which we answered questions in private.10 Prior to the 
first round of the first treatment, subjects played 2 trial rounds in the standards sessions 
and 3 trial rounds in the permits sessions. In the standards sessions each period lasted 2 
minutes. In the permits sessions each period lasted 5 minutes, to give subjects time to 
                                                 
10 Instructions of the market experiments available in the Online Appendix. 
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make their bids, asks, and to decide how many units to produce and how many permits 
to buy or sell.  
After all subjects in the group had made their decision, the computer program 
automatically produced a random number between 0 and 1 for each subject. If this 
number was below the informed monitoring probability, the subject was inspected, as 
explained in the instructions. Subjects were informed in their screen whether they had 
been selected for inspection or not, and the result of the inspection (violation level, total 
fine and net profits after inspection). After this, subjects were informed in their screen 
the history of their decisions in the game, the history of inspections and the history of 
profits, up to the last period just played. After 20 seconds in this screen, the next period 
began automatically.  
Two hundreds and sixteen (216) experimental subjects participated in the 
permits experiments and 219 in the standards experiments. Due a thin pool of subjects, 
we allow subjects to participate in more than one session. Eliminating reappearances, 
the total number of different subjects that participated in the permits experiments was 
120 and the total number of different subjects that participated in the standards 
experiments was 113. 
We set the exchange rate between experimental and Uruguayan pesos in 40 ($E 
40 = $U 1). The value produced an average expected payment for the participation in 
the experiment that was similar to what an advanced student could earn in the market 
for two hours of work (the duration of the sessions), including a showing up fee of 
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around US$ 7.11 Total payments ranged between US$ 16.8 and US$ 5.1 in the tradable 
permits sessions, with a mean value of US$ 13.7, a median of US$ 14.1 and a standard 
deviation of US$ 2.1. In the standards sessions, payments ranged between US$ 5.1 and 
US$ 30.3, with a mean value of US$ 20.2, a median of US$ 18.9 and a standard 
deviation of US$ 5.3.  
5 Results  
In this section, we present the results of our work. We present the outcomes of the 
permits experiments first, then those of the standards experiments and finally we 
compare results between instruments. 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics of Market Experiments 
We report basic descriptive statistics of relevant variables in Table 2. The first thing 
to notice is that violations are positive, on average, for all types of firms in both 
treatments. With the exception of firms of type 2 in the treatment M2, all average levels 
of violations are below one unit. This result is not new. The literature has already 
reported positive average levels of violations in experiments of tradable permits 
designed to induce perfect compliance in equilibrium. Murphy and Stranlund (2007) 
report levels of violation between 0.1 to 0.4 units for firms with production capacity of 
8 or 17 units, depending on the firm’s type. In Cason and Gangadharan (2005) violation 
rates were between 15% and 37%, depending on the relative costs and benefits of 
compliance, in treatments where the violation rate is expected to be zero. In spite of the 
                                                 
11 We paid US$ 5 as a show up fee in the first sessions of the experiments. We decided to increase it to 
US$ 7 due to our thin pool of subjects. 
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average positive levels of violations, the median level of violation is zero for all type of 
firms in both treatments. Overall, the compliance rate is 70.0%. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics Permits treatments 
 
Average 
Price 
per 
period  
Number of 
Transactions 
per period 
Type 1 
(𝒍𝟎 = 𝟒) 
Type 2 
(𝒍𝟎 = 𝟒) 
Type 3 
(𝒍𝟎 = 𝟔) 
Type 4 
(𝒍𝟎 = 𝟔) 
    q  l v q  L v q  l v q  l v 
TREATMENT  M1 - Increasing marginal penalty 
Theory  74-80 10 7 7 0 6 6 0 4 4 0 3 3 0 
Experiments 
Mean 79.2 8.5 6.5 5.7 0.8 6.5 5.9 0.6 4.8 4.4 0.4 4.3 3.9 0.3 
Median 79.6 8.0 6.0 6.0 0.0 6.0 6.0 0.0 5.0 4.0 0.0 4.0 4.0 0.0 
Std. Dev. 7.1 2.6 1.3 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.6 1.4 1.2 0.6 
# obs. 117 117 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 
TREATMENT M2 - Constant marginal penalty 
Theory   74-80 10 7 7 0 6 6 0 4 4 0 3 3 0 
Experiments 
Mean  75.8 9.7 6.9 6.2 0.7 6.9 5.5 1.3 5.0 4.4 0.5 4.1 3.8 0.2 
Median 75.7 10.0 7.0 7.0 0.0 7.0 6.0 0.0 5.0 4.0 0.0 4.0 4.0 0.0 
Std. Dev. 6.1 2.9 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.5 1.3 1.1 1.4 1.2 1.1 0.6 
# obs. 150 150 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 
 
Notes: we dropped one transaction with a price of $E 752. A subject in a group went bankrupt in round 7 of Treatment M1. We dropped the observations of rounds 8 – 10 of 
that group.  
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We can also see that prospective sellers (firms of type 3 and type 4) withhold a 
higher-than-expected number of permits on average in both treatments. The other side 
of the coin is that the final holdings of permits for prospective buyers’ (type 1 and type 
2 firms) was, on average, lower than expected. 
The average price of the permits traded was within the predicted range (74 – 80 
experimental pesos) in both treatments, but it was E$ 3.4 higher in the case of the 
treatment with the increasing marginal penalty (M1). The difference is persistent across 
periods (see Figure 1). We also observe an average number of transactions in treatment 
M1 (8.5) that is lower that the predicted level (10) and lower than the average in M2 
(9.7).  
Figure 1: Evolution of average prices by treatment 
 
 
5.2 Hypothesis 1 Tests (Market Experiments) 
5.2.1 Non-parametric tests 
Recall that the experimental markets mimic the situation of a market for pollution 
permits where the regulator has perfect information of the marginal abatement costs of 
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the firms and uses this information to set the marginal penalty to induce perfect 
compliance cost-effectively. Hypothesis 1 establishes that in this setting the level of 
individual and aggregate violations should be the same if the regulator uses a convex or 
a linear penalty. In an experiment were subjects do not participate in more than one 
session, each experimental market provides only one independent observation (Davis 
and Holt, 1993). In this case, Hypothesis 1 is 𝑉𝑀1 = 𝑉𝑀2, where V is the sum of 
violations of the eight subjects that comprise a market, averaged across ten periods, and 
the superscript M1 or M2 indicate whether the market is enforced with a convex or 
linear penalty. 
According to both the Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test (𝑝 = 0.43, 𝑧 =
 −0.781, 𝑛 = 27) and the median test (𝑝 = 0.547, 𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛 𝑐ℎ𝑖2 = 0.3635, 𝑛 = 27), 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the aggregate level of violations is the same 
between treatments with convex and linear penalties.12  
5.2.2 Regressions 
As commented above, we did allow subjects to participate in more than one session 
due to a thin population.13 A natural solution would be to perform the same tests using 
only the markets in which no subject was repeating, but we have a small number of such 
                                                 
12 In the Wilcoxon test the null hypothesis is, more formally, that the distribution of violations is the same 
in both markets. In the Median test, the null is that the two samples are drawn from populations with the 
same median violation. We treat the samples as unrelated, because the same group of subjects did not 
participate in the two treatments. 
13 Of the 120 different subjects that participated in the experiments, 66 subjects showed up only once and 
54 subjects showed up more than once (25 subjects showed up 2 times, 19 subjects showed up 3 times, 7 
subjects showed up 4 times and 3 subjects showed up 5 times). 
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groups. Instead, we conduct an econometric analysis controlling for observations 
belonging to a subject that is repeating participation.14 Other controls that we included 
are the following indicators: linear penalty, treatment was first in session (and an 
interaction with the former), type of subject, period of play and the group of eight 
(market) in which the subject participated. We add the category of risk aversion of the 
subject to these indicators. The categories of risk aversion are the following: risk lover, 
risk-neutral and risk-averse.15 Finally, we also include an indicator for the subjects that 
made inconsistent risk choices.16  
                                                 
14 We identify subjects by matching the amount of total profits made in the session with the amount of the 
payment in the receipt, where the name of the subject was. This procedure, nevertheless, fails in the case 
two subjects in the same session made the same amount of profits. This issue prevented us from 
identifying 8 subjects.  
15 To elicit the risk preferences of the participants, we asked them to answer a Holt and Laury (2002) type 
of questionnaire. In this questionnaire, subjects made consecutive choices between a certain amount of 
money and lotteries. The certain amount of money (U$ 800) remained fixed over the consecutive choices, 
while the lotteries had increasing probabilities of wining the higher prize (U$ 1300) over the lower one 
(U$300) (see Online Appendix).  Based on these choices, we constructed a categorical variable for risk 
lovers, risk neutral and risk averse individuals, based on the number of the choice in which the subject 
switched to preferring the lottery.  
16 Subjects made inconsistent choices in 45/216 cases. We assigned a missing value to the risk aversion 
category in these cases. If the subject participated in more than one session and did not exhibit 
inconsistent choices every time it participated, we calculated the average risk-aversion category of the 
subject in the non-missing observations and input it to its missing observations. If the subject had 
inconsistent choices in all observations, we input the subject the average category of risk aversion of the 
whole sample. As expected, 80% of the individuals that participated in the experiments exhibited some 
degree of risk aversion. 
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We present the results of two regressions in Table 3. In the second column, the 
dependent variable is the level of individual violations per period, allowing this level to 
be negative for the case of over-compliance.17 In this case, we ran a random effects 
model with robust standard errors. In the third column, we present a random effects 
Probit model, where the dependent variable is the violation status, a variable that takes 
the value of one in the case of positive violations and zero otherwise.  
 
Table 3: Violation Regressions 
  
Random Effects 
model  
Probit RE 
model 
Dependent variable:  
Level of individual 
violation 
Violation 
status  
  Coefficient Coefficient 
 (Std error) (Std error) 
Linear penalty 0.895 -2.666** 
 (1.178) (1.250) 
First treatment in session 0.641 -1.126 
 (0.791) (1.070) 
First treat. * Linear penalty  -1.091 2.640* 
 (1.255) (1.379) 
Risk category -0.639* -0.482 
 (0.330) (0.326) 
Inconsistent risk preferences 0.546** 0.363 
 (0.277) (0.354) 
# times participated before -0.0310 0.205 
 (0.0915) (0.163) 
Type indicator Yes Yes 
Period indicator Yes Yes 
Group indicator Yes Yes 
Constant 1.473** 1.607 
  (0.714) (1.382) 
N        1,806 1,806 
N_clust 112 112 
* p<0.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01   
 
                                                 
17 Results do not change if the dependent variable is the level of violation censored-at-zero. The reason is 
that over-compliance was observed only in a few cases. 
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Table 3 shows that the individual level of violations is not affected by the structure of 
the penalty function in a statistical significant way. The structure of the penalty does 
affect the violation status, though. A linear penalty induces more compliance than the 
convex penalty at the 1% significance level. The effect seems to be somewhat weaker 
(in economic and statistical senses) if subjects play first the treatments in question.  
These results are robust to different specifications and its combinations. More 
specifically, both results are robust to indicating with a dummy variable whether the 
subject had participated in an experiment before or not, instead of a variable counting 
the number of times she participated before. They are also robust to measuring risk 
preferences in a scale from one to ten, instead of three classes.  
The overall results of the tests for Hypothesis 1 is that the penalty structure, as 
parametrized in our experiments, does not seem to affect in a statistical significant way 
the aggregate and individual levels of violations in a market for pollution permits but it 
affects the individual compliance status. Across subjects and periods, the violation rate 
was higher with a convex penalty (32.3%) than with a linear penalty (27.9%). As 
expected, 87.6% of the individual levels of violations observed were lower or equal to 
one unit. This suggests that the effect of the penalty structure may operate at the margin. 
Effectively, while the distribution of the levels of violations is somewhat more skewed 
to the right in the case of a linear penalty than in the case of a convex penalty (over 
compliance is negligible in both cases), the main difference between both treatments 
occur with the 0-unit and 1-unit levels of violations. Linearizing the penalty for 
violations produces the 0-unit violations (perfect compliance) to increase from 67% to 
72% and the 1-unit to decrease from 22% to 14%, while providing the same incentive at 
the margin.  
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What could be driving this result? Although standard theory does not explain the 
observed differences, it may be of help to answer this question. The equilibrium price of 
permits in a market for pollution permits is a function of the number of permits issued 
by the regulator, of the abatement costs parameters of the firms and of the level of the 
enforcement parameters. According to theory, and the design of the experiment, the 
equilibrium price of permits should be between E$ 74 and E$80 in both treatments. As 
we see in Table 2, the average price of traded permits in both treatment were within 
these bounds. Nevertheless, Table 2 also shows that the average price was higher with a 
convex penalty (E$ 79.2) than with a linear penalty (E$ 75.8). An increase in the price 
of permits, for whatever reason, causes a net increase in the cost of compliance. 
Therefore, an increase in the price of permits may be an obvious channel for the 
increase in violations. We explore this channel below. To do it, we compare the average 
market price of permits with linear and convex penalties running a random-effects 
regression, conditioning on the structure of the penalty, the order of the treatment, the 
period and the number of the subjects in the experimental market that are not 
participating for the first time.18 Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.  
We can see in Table 3 that, a linear penalty decrease the price of traded permits 
between by E$ 6.5 with respect to an identical market enforced with a convex penalty at 
the 1% significant level. This happens when it should not, because in both markets 
                                                 
18 Results do not change if we use a dummy variable equal to one if at least one subject in the market had 
participated before in a session. They do not change either if we use the market aggregate level of 
experience (the sum of the number of times the subjects in the market had participated before). They 
change at the decimal level if we do not condition on the whether subjects in the market had experience or 
not. 
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marginal penalties are set high enough to induce compliance. In the third column of 
table 4 we included the result of a similar regression but with the total number of 
permits traded in a given period and market as the dependent variable. One can see that 
the number of trades increases by 2.5 with a linear penalty, but at the 5% significance 
level.  
 
Table 4: Regressions on the average price and number of transactions 
Random effects 
Dependent variable: 
Average 
price 
# of 
Transactions 
 
  
Coefficient 
(Std. 
Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Linear Penalty -6.509*** 2.503** 
 (1.663) (1.048) 
First -8.684*** 2.689*** 
 (2.363) (0.942) 
First*M2 6.048* -2.677* 
 (3.337) (1.468) 
# subjects that repeat in the group 0.610** -0.109 
 (0.283) (0.113) 
Period dummies Yes Yes 
Constant 78.93*** 7.871*** 
  (1.515) (1.105) 
N        267 267 
N_clust 27 27 
* p<0.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01   
 
In sum, the results in Table 4 provide strong evidence that a linear penalty 
decreases the price of the permits with respect to a convex penalty. Providing a 
comprehensive explanation of what is driving this phenomenon is beyond the objective 
of this paper; but we perform some explanatory analysis below.  
The explored channels by which the structure of the penalty affects prices of 
permits are bids and asks of permits. To do it, we perform a series of regressions similar 
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to those presented in Table 4, except that we do not condition on the experience of 
subjects, to compare different statistics of bids made by buyers (type 1 and 2 firms) and 
asks made by sellers (type 3 and 4 firms) with linear and convex penalties.19  
We do not find any statistically significant effect on the structure of the penalty 
on bids. We do find effects on asks. A linear penalty decreases the minimum ask 
observed in a given market and period by E$ 5.8 at the 1% significant level. It also 
decreases the lower 25% ask by a similar amount at the same level of statistical 
significance. Finally, it decreases the median ask by E$ 4.8 at the 5% significance level. 
It does not have a statistically significant effect on the upper 75% and maximum ask. 
Moreover, we do not find any statistically significant effect of the structure of the fine 
on the accepted bids and we do find it for the case of accepted asks for the same 
statistics (the minimum, the lower 25% and the median). The conclusion is that 
potential sellers increase the price at which they are willing to sell with a convex 
penalty and that is what driving the prices up. We do not observe a similar result on bids 
by potential buyers. It is the supply side of the market, not the demand side, which 
drives the effect of penalties on prices.  
Finally, we explore whether the structure of the fine changes the number of 
“expected transactions” (potential sellers selling to potential buyers) or a change in the 
number of unexpected transactions (potential sellers buying or potential buyers selling). 
To do this we perform similar regressions to the ones performed for the case of bids and 
asks, but with “expected transactions” and “unexpected transactions” as the dependent 
                                                 
19 We do not present tables with the full results of these regressions for space reasons. They are available 
upon request. 
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variable. We do not show the full results for space reasons, but we find that what drives 
all the effect of the fine on the number of transactions is its effect on “expected 
transactions”. Although we observe secondary market, unexpected transactions, the 
structure of the penalty does not affect the number of these transactions in any 
statistically significant magnitude.   
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5.3 Descriptive Statistics for Standards Experiments 
We present in this section the results of the standards experiments. In these 
experiments, we recall, subjects face an emission standard (maximum legal level of 
emissions) instead of a market for pollution permits. We set four different emission 
standards, one for each type of firm, at the theoretical level of emissions (and demand 
for permits) of each type of firm in the market for tradable permits equilibrium. For the 
rest, the standards experiments are the same as the market experiments. In particular, we 
induce perfect compliance with a convex penalty in one treatment (S1) and with a linear 
penalty in the other treatment (S2). More specifically, the initial level for the marginal 
penalty is 133.33 for the first unit of violation, but for the following levels the penalty is 
more severe for S1. 
Table 5 shows that, as it was the case with tradable permits, cost-effective perfect 
enforcement does not produce zero violations. The average level of violations is 
between 0 and 1 across subjects and periods for every type of firm in both treatments. 
Also as in the case of tradable permits, the median violation is zero in every case, 
notwithstanding. Overall, across subjects, periods and treatments, the compliance rate 
was 62.75%.  
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics for the standards treatments  
 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 
  q v q v q v q v 
TREATMENT S1 
s =7 s =6 s =4 s =4 
Increasing marginal penalty 
Theory  7 0 6 0 4 0 3 0 
Experiments         
 Mean 7.5 0.5 6.6 0.6 4.6 0.6 3.6 0.6 
 Median 7.0 0.0 6.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 
 StdDev 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
 Nº obs 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 
TREATMENT S2 
s =7 s =6 s =4 s =3 
Constant marginal penalty 
Theory  7 0 6 0 4 0 3 0 
Experiments         
 Mean 7.6 0.6 6.8 0.8 4.7 0.7 3.6 0.6 
 Median 7.0 0.0 6.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 
 StdDev 1.0 1.0 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 
 Nº obs 180 180 180 180 170 170 180 180 
Notes: Seven subjects showed up in a session. In this session, we had a type-4 subject missing. Fourteen 
subjects showed up in another session, where we had a type-3 and a type-4 subjects missing. In three 
more session, fourteen subjects showed up in excess of a multiple of eight. The program allocated these 
subjects a type 4. Three subjects went bankrupt in two different sessions while playing S1 treatment. 
They were all type 4. We dropped their observations. We replaced the observations of the 2 missing 3 and 
bankrupted type-4 subjects with five of the type-4 subjects from the sessions with excess of subjects. 
 
 
5.4 Hypothesis 2 Tests (Standard Experiments) 
5.4.1 Non-parametric tests 
 
We now turn to the test of Hypothesis 2. Recalling, this hypothesis states that 
there should be no difference in individual levels of violations if a regulator uses a 
convex or a linear penalty, when both penalties produce the same incentive in the 
margin and this is enough to induce compliance. More formally, Hypothesis 2 is 𝑣𝑆1 =
𝑣𝑆2, where v is the individual level of violation of a given type of firm, averaged across 
ten periods, and the superscript S1 or S2 indicate whether the firm faces a convex or 
linear penalty. According to both the Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test (𝑝 =
0.87, 𝑧 =  −0.16, 𝑛 = 207) and the median test (𝑝 = 0.92, 𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛 𝑐ℎ𝑖2 = 0.01, 𝑛 =
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207), we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the average individual levels of 
violations are the same between treatments with convex and linear penalties. 
5.4.2 Regressions 
As in the case of the market experiments, the non-parametric tests of the 
previous section may be biased because, as commented in Section 4, we allow subjects 
to participate in the sessions more than once. The 207 observations in the above tests 
are not decisions of 207 different subjects but of 113.20 We tackle this as we did in the 
previous section with the market experiments: comparing the level of individual 
violations with a linear and a convex penalty by using a random-effects regression 
where we control for the number of times the subject participated in an experiment 
before the one in question. We present the results of this econometric analysis in Table 
6 below.  
Table 6: Violation Regressions 
  Random Effects model  Probit RE model 
Dependent variable: Level of individual violation Violation status 
  Coefficient Coefficient 
  (Std error) (Std error) 
Linear Penalty -0.216 -0.411 
 (0.237) (0.481) 
First -0.0508 0.229 
 (0.211) (0.487) 
First treat. * Linear Penalty 0.181 0.0287 
 (0.311) (0.592) 
Risk category -0.158 0.0569 
 (0.144) (0.228) 
Inconsistent risk preferences 0.162 0.451* 
 (0.117) (0.250) 
# times participated before -0.0781* -0.295*** 
 (0.0409) (0.0964) 
                                                 
20 Of the 113 different subjects that participated in the standards experiments, 65 subjects showed up only 
once, 19 subjects showed up 2 times, 18 subjects showed up 3 times, 5 subjects showed up 4 times and 6 
subjects showed up 5 times. 
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Type indicator Yes Yes 
Period indicator Yes Yes 
Group Indicator Yes Yes 
Constant 1.262*** -0.0461 
 (0.438) (0.810) 
Number of observations 1,860 1,860 
Number of subjects 108 108 
* p<0.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01   
 
Replicating the analysis we presented for the market experiments, we present the 
results of two random effects regressions with robust standard errors: one with the 
uncensored level of individual violation as the dependent variable (in the second 
column) and a Probit model with the violation status as the dependent variable (in the 
third one). According to these estimations, there is no statistically significant difference 
on the level or status of violations between treatments.21 
6 Discussion and conclusions 
We have found that a convex penalty, as compared to a linear penalty, increases 
the market price of pollution permits and increases the violation rate of firms. We do 
not observe this effect of convex penalties on the compliance status of firms with 
emission standards. The latter suggests that the channel by which a convex penalty 
increases noncompliance is through the increase in the prices of permits. 
The effect of the structure of the fine on the price of permits operates through an 
increase in the asking prices of sellers, not on the bids by suppliers. With convex 
penalties, sellers are not willing to sell a permit at a price as low as with linear penalties.  
These results have important policy implications. First, if firms´ rate of 
compliance in a cap and trade program are lower with convex penalties (relative to 
                                                 
21 We have only 2 observations in 1860 in which a subject decided to over comply. 
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linear penalties), the regulator may need inspect firms more frequently in order to attain 
the same cap of emissions when using convex penalties. This means that using linear 
penalties would be cost effective with respect to using convex penalties, even when 
perfectly enforcing the cap.  
Relatedly, it has been recognized long ago that financial penalties are “close 
relatives” of safety valves (Jacoby and Ellerman, 2004). In the words of Sigman (2012): 
“(i)n an emission trading system, non- Draconian fines can play the role of a “safety 
valve,” allowing polluters to avoid buying permits during price spikes and, thus, 
effectively setting a ceiling on the marginal cost of carbon reductions” (p. 216). Our 
results are consistent with these observations.  
Finally, our results may have implications for the initial allocation of permits. 
Given a convex penalty, a regulator who seeks to design a cost-effective program 
should try to increase the allocation of permits to would be buyers firms and to reduce 
the initial allocation of permits to would be sellers firms. This will reduce the upward 
pressure on permit prices, reduce the violation rates of firms, and consequently reducing 
enforcement costs.  
This work can be extended in different ways. Most notably, additional 
experimental designs that include other penalty structures can help to understand how 
the enforcement structures affect incentives for compliance with regulations. For 
example, it is common that penaties depends also on past compliance behavior of firms 
and consider make good provisions, features that we did not consider in our analysis. 
Also, variation in the parameters could help us to shed light on the ways that 
enforcement and monitoring effort provides incentives for compliance under different 
penalty structures and regulatory instruments. 
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